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People sometimes solve problems with a unique process called insight, accompanied by an ‘‘Aha!’’ experience. It has
long been unclear whether different cognitive and neural processes lead to insight versus noninsight solutions, or if
solutions differ only in subsequent subjective feeling. Recent behavioral studies indicate distinct patterns of
performance and suggest differential hemispheric involvement for insight and noninsight solutions. Subjects solved
verbal problems, and after each correct solution indicated whether they solved with or without insight. We observed
two objective neural correlates of insight. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (Experiment 1) revealed increased
activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to noninsight solutions. The same
region was active during initial solving efforts. Scalp electroencephalogram recordings (Experiment 2) revealed a
sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight
solutions. This right anterior temporal area is associated with making connections across distantly related information
during comprehension. Although all problem solving relies on a largely shared cortical network, the sudden flash of
insight occurs when solvers engage distinct neural and cognitive processes that allow them to see connections that
previously eluded them.
Introduction
According to legend, Archimedes shouted ‘‘Eureka!’’ (‘‘I
have found it!’’) when he suddenly discovered that water
displacement could be used to calculate density. Since then,
‘‘Eureka!,’’ or ‘‘Aha!,’’ has often been used to express the
feeling one gets when solving a problem with insight. Insight is
pervasive in human (and possibly animal [Epstein et al. 1984])
cognition, occurring in perception, memory retrieval, lan-
guage comprehension, problem solving, and various forms of
practical, artistic, and scientiﬁc creativity (Sternberg and
Davidson 1995). The Archimedes legend has persisted over
two millennia in part because it illustrates some of the key
ways in which insight solutions differ from solutions achieved
through more straightforward problem solving. We examine
the neural bases of these different problem-solving methods.
Although many processes are shared by most types of
problem solving, insight solutions appear to differ from
noninsight solutions in several important ways. The clearest
deﬁning characteristic of insight problem solving is the
subjective ‘‘Aha!’’ or ‘‘Eureka!’’ experience that follows insight
solutions (Schooler et al. 1993). This subjective experience
can lead to a strong emotional response—according to
legend, Archimedes ran home from the baths shouting
‘‘Eureka!’’ without donning his clothes ﬁrst. In addition,
problem solving with insight is characterized by the following
features. (1) Solvers ﬁrst come to an impasse, no longer
progressing toward a solution (Duncker 1945). Archimedes,
for example, was stymied by King Hiero’s challenge to
determine whether his new crown was pure gold without
damaging the crown. (2) Solvers usually cannot report the
processing that enables them to reinterpret the problem and
overcome the impasse (Maier 1931). Insight often occurs
when people are not even aware they are thinking of the
problem, as reportedly happened to Archimedes while in the
baths. (3) Solvers experience their solutions as arising
suddenly (Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987; Smith and Kounios
1996) and immediately recognize the correctness of the
solution (or solution path). (4) Performance on insight
problems is associated with creative thinking and other
cognitive abilities different from those associated with
performance on noninsight problems (Schooler and Melcher
1997). Some researchers have argued that all these character-
istics of insight solutions are essentially epiphenomenal, that
insight and noninsight solutions vary only in emotional
intensity, and that they are attained with precisely the same
cognitive (hence neural) mechanisms (Weisberg and Alba
1981; Weisberg 1986; Perkins 2000).
Persistent questions about insight concern whether uncon-
scious processing precedes reinterpretation and solution,
whether distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms beyond a
common problem-solving network are involved in insight,
and whether the apparent suddenness of insight solutions
reﬂects truly sudden changes in cognitive processing and
neural activity.
Recent work suggests that people are thinking—at an
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PLoS BIOLOGYunconscious level—about the solution prior to solving
problems with insight. Speciﬁcally, while working on a verbal
problem they have yet to solve, people presented with a
potential solution word read the actual solution word faster
than they read an unrelated word (Bowden and Beeman
1998). This ‘‘solution priming’’ effect is greater—and in fact
people make solution decisions about presented words more
quickly—when words are presented to the left visual hemi-
ﬁeld, which projects directly to the right hemisphere (RH),
than when words are presented to the right visual hemiﬁeld,
which projects to the left hemisphere (LH). This suggests that
RH semantic processing is more likely than LH semantic
processing to produce lexical or semantic information that
leads to the solution. These RH advantages occur only when
solvers experience insight—the ‘‘Aha!’’ or ‘‘Eureka!’’ feeling
that comes with insight solutions (Bowden and Jung-Beeman
2003a). Moreover, when subjects try to solve classic insight
problems, they beneﬁt more from hints presented to the left
visual ﬁeld (i.e., the RH) than from hints presented to the
right visual ﬁeld (i.e., the LH) (Fiore and Schooler 1998).
Problem solving is a complex behavior that requires a
network of cortical areas for all types of solving strategies and
solutions, so solving problems with and without insight likely
invokes many shared cognitive processes and neural mech-
anisms. One critical cognitive process distinguishing insight
solutions from noninsight solutions is that solving with
insight requires solvers to recognize distant or novel semantic
(or associative) relations; hence, insight-speciﬁc neural
activity should reﬂect that process. The most likely area to
contribute to this component of insight problem solving is
the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG) of the RH.
Language comprehension studies demonstrate that the RH is
particularly important for recognizing distant semantic
relations (Chiarello et al. 1990; Beeman 1998), and bilateral
aSTG is involved in semantic integration. For example,
sentences and complex discourse increase neural activity in
aSTG bilaterally (Mazoyer et al. 1993; Stowe et al. 1999), and
discourse that places particular demands on recognizing or
computing distant semantic relations speciﬁcally increases
neural activity in RH temporal areas (St. George et al. 1999;
Mason and Just 2004), especially aSTG (Meyer et al. 2000;
Kircher et al. 2001). If this prediction of RH aSTG involve-
ment is conﬁrmed, it will help constrain neurocognitive
theories of insight. Other cortical areas, such as prefrontal
cortex and the anterior cingulate (AC) may also be differ-
entially involved in producing insight and noninsight
solutions.
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) in
Experiment 1 and electroencephalogram (EEG) measurement
in Experiment 2 to test the empirically and theoretically
derived hypothesis that solving problems with insight
requires engagement of (or increased emphasis on) distinct
neural mechanisms, particularly in the RH anterior temporal
lobe. Event-related experimental designs compared neural
activity when people solved verbal problems with insight to
neural activity when they solved problems (from the same
problem set) without insight.
As in earlier behavioral work, we used a set of compound
remote associate problems (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003b)
adapted from a test of creative cognition (Mednick 1962).
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence for each trial. Subjects saw
three problem words (pine, crab, sauce) and attempted to
produce a single solution word (apple) that can form a familiar
compound word or phrase with each of the three problem
words (pineapple, crab apple, applesauce). We relied on solvers’
reports to sort solutions into insight solutions and noninsight
solutions, avoiding the complication that presumed insight
problems can sometimes be solved without insight (Davidson
1995) and circumventing the use of different types of
problems requiring different cognitive operations. Thus, we
made use of the most important deﬁning characteristic of
insight problems: the subjective conscious experience—the
‘‘Aha!’’ A similar technique revealed distinct behavioral
characteristics when people recognized solutions with insight
(Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003a). Note that this is a very
‘‘tight’’ comparison. In both conditions problems are solved
using a network of processes common to both insight and
noninsight solutions. If insight ratings reﬂect some distinct
cognitive processes, this contrast will reveal the distinct
underlying brain activity. In other words, within the cortical
network for problem solving, different components will be
engaged or emphasized for insight versus noninsight solu-
tions. FMRI (Experiment 1) should reveal neuroanatomical
locations of processes that are unique to insight solutions,
and EEG (Experiment 2) should reveal the time course (e.g.,
whether insight really is sudden) and frequency character-
istics of neurophysiological differences.
Results
Experiment 1
Subjects solved 59% of the problems presented, and
pressed buttons indicating ‘‘insight’’ for 56% (s.d. = 18.2)
of their solutions, ‘‘no insight’’ for 41% (s.d. = 18.9) of their
solutions, and ‘‘other’’ for 2% of their solutions. We marked a
point about 2 s (rounded to the nearest whole second) prior
to each solution button press as the solution event, and
examined a time window 4–9 s after this event (i.e., 2–7 s after
the button press) to isolate the corresponding hemodynamic
Figure 1. Sequence of Events for Each Trial
(A) The ‘‘Compound’’ prompt was presented for 0.5 s, then persisted
for a variable amount of additional time (0–2 s) until a cue from the
scanner indicated the beginning of a new whole brain acquisition. (B)
A three-word problem appeared in the center of the screen and
persisted until subjects indicated with a bimanual button press that
they had solved the problem, or until the 30-s time limit elapsed.
Thus, event timing and condition were completely dependent on
subjects’ responses. (C) Following the button press or time limit,
subjects were prompted to verbalize the solution (or press the buttons
and say ‘‘Don’t know’’ if the time limit expired prior to solution) then
(D) prompted to indicate (with a bimanual button press) whether they
felt insight, as described prior to the experiment. (E) Next, subjects
performed 9 s of an unrelated ﬁller task (three line-matching trials, 3
s each), allowing BOLD signal to return to baseline (in areas not
involved in line matching).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g001
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Insight in the Brainresponse. Solving problems and responding to them required
a strict sequence of events (reading of words, solving effort,
solving, button press, verbalizing the solution, insight
decision), but this sequence was identical whether subjects
indicated solving with or without insight, so differences in
FMRI signal resulted from the degree to which distinct
cognitive processes and neural systems led to insight or
noninsight solutions.
Figure 2 illustrates the most robust insight effect: as
predicted, insight solutions were associated with greater
neural activity in the RH aSTG than noninsight solutions. The
active area was slightly anterior to primary auditory cortex,
posterior to temporal pole, and along the medial aspect of
the aSTG, extending down the lateral edge of the descending
ramus of the Sylvian ﬁssure to midway through the middle
temporal gyrus (MTG). (This site is also close to the superior
temporal sulcus, which has been implicated in language).
Across all 13 subjects, the peak signal difference at a single
voxel within the RH aSTG was 0.25% across the 6-s window,
and 0.30% at a single time to repetition (TR), i.e., the time
needed to repeat the image of the whole brain. Overall signal
in this region was robust, reaching 96.8% of the brainwide
average (after removing voxels in other brain areas with
signal below a standard criterion). Within the cluster of voxels
identiﬁed across the group, 12 subjects showed from 0.03% to
0.35% greater signal for insight than for noninsight solutions;
one subject showed 0.02% greater signal for the noninsight
solutions. It is not likely that RH aSTG is involved only in
output or in emotional response following insight solutions,
because neural activity in this area also increased when
subjects ﬁrst encountered each problem (Figure 3). Thus, RH
aSTG is involved in processing the problem words both
initially and at solution. (Of course, event-related FMRI signal
occurred in many other cortical regions at problem onset,
especially visual cortex). There was no insight effect in
response windows immediately preceding or following the
deﬁned response window. All indications point to a striking
transient event in the RH aSTG near the time when subjects
solve problems with insight.
The involvement of the RH rather than the LH for this
verbal task is not due to greater difﬁculty in producing
insight solutions: subjects produced insight solutions at least
as quickly (mean solution time = 10.25 s, s.d. = 3.58 s) as they
produced noninsight solutions (mean = 11.28 s, s.d. = 4.13 s)
(t , 1.0, p . 0.3). More importantly, the hemodynamic
responses to both insight and noninsight solutions in the
homologous area of the LH are about equivalent to the
Figure 2. FMRI Insight Effect in RH aSTG
(A) Voxels showing greater FMRI signal
for insight than noninsight solutions,
overlaid on the averaged normalized
structural image of all subjects. The
active area has a volume of 531 mm
3
(peak t = 4.89 at 44,  9,  9 in Talairach
space).
(B) and (C) Group average signal change
following the solution event, for insight
(red line) and noninsight (blue line)
solutions (yellow arrow indicates button
press): (B) over entire LH aSTG region;
(C) over entire RH aSTG region.
(D) Insight solution signal change minus
noninsight solution signal change, in RH
aSTG (error bars show the standard
error of the mean of the difference at
each timepoint).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g002
Figure 3. FMRI Signal in RH aSTG during Initial Solving Efforts
(A) Voxels in right temporal lobe showing baseline-to-peak event-
related FMRI signal when subjects ﬁrst encounter problems, overlaid
on the averaged normalized structural image of all subjects. The
cluster is in RH aSTG, with a volume of 469 mm
3, with peak t value of
4.37 at 41,  6,  12 in Talairach space, clearly overlapping with the
cluster showing an insight effect at solution.
(B) Group average signal change following problem onset (time = 0),
for the cluster deﬁned by signal at the problem onset (green line) and
the cluster (illustrated in Figure 2A) showing the insight effect at
solution (white line). Error bars show the standard error of the mean
of the difference at each time point.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g003
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Insight in the Brainresponse to noninsight solutions in the RH aSTG—it is the
strong response to insight solutions in the RH aSTG that
stands out. There is no insight effect anywhere within
temporal cortex of the LH. At statistical thresholds below
signiﬁcant levels (p , 0.1 uncorrected), there are as many
voxels in LH temporal cortex showing a noninsight effect as
showing an insight effect.
Several other cortical areas showing insight effects that did
not meet signiﬁcance criteria are listed in Table 1 (see also
Figure S1). Some of these effects were in frontal cortex, which
is notable because various frontal areas have been implicated
in problem solving and reasoning. Patients with prefrontal
damage have particular difﬁculty integrating relations in
reasoning tasks (Waltz et al. 1999), and when healthy subjects
perform the same task, neural activity increases in rostro-
lateral prefrontal cortext (Christoff et al. 2001). Some
problem solving increases activity in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (Prabhakaran et al. 1997), perhaps because of working
memory demands. Solving of poorly structured problems
seems particularly impaired following damage to the pre-
frontal cortex of the RH (Goel and Grafman 2000). Moreover,
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is highly active when people
engage in directed semantic retrieval (Wagner et al. 2001) or
when they select particular semantic concepts over compet-
ing ones (Thompson-Schill et al. 1997), e.g., to generate a
response (Frith et al. 1991). Usually in these circumstances the
IFG activity is stronger in the LH, even when people are
reasoning about spatial problems (Goel et al. 1998), but the
IFG responds particularly strongly in the RH when subjects
select more distant semantic relations because of task
demands (Seger et al. 2000) or comprehension goals
(Robertson et al. 2000). Because of its putative importance
for problem solving, semantic retrieval, and semantic
selection, IFG was an a priori region of interest. One question
we had hoped to answer was whether the semantic selection
of insight solutions would preferentially evoke activity in RH
or LH IFG, but the insight effects in both areas were too small
(in area and in reliability) to test this question. When a more
lenient statistical threshold was adopted, small clusters of
signal were observed in both RH and LH IFG (Table 1; Figure
S1A). Indeed, within the small region surpassing this weak
statistical threshold, signal change in the RH IFG region was
moderately strong (peak = 0.21% across the whole window).
However, as is often the case, FMRI signal in this region was
low (about 72% of the brainwide average) and variability was
high, decreasing our conﬁdence in the effect.
After RH aSTG, the second largest area showing an insight
effect in FMRI signal was the medial frontal gyrus in the LH
(Table 1; Figure S1B). Although this area was 85% as large
(453 mm
3 at p , 0.005 threshold) as RH aSTG, the event-
related signal within it was weak and the insight–noninsight
difference (peak difference = 0.15%) was relatively small.
(The insight effect may be attributable as much to a negative
response for noninsight solutions as to a positive response for
insight solutions.)
There also was an insight effect in small clusters in or near
bilateral amygdala or parahippocampal gyrus. Again, regional
signal was low (83% of the brainwide average), and the signal
difference was small (peak = 0.16%). However, an amygdalar
response may be expected, given the emotional sensation of
the insight experience (Parsons and Osherson, 2001). Hippo-
campal or parahippocampal involvement is also plausible, if
memory interacts with insight solutions differently from how
it interacts with noninsight solutions. For instance, insight
problems may encourage distinct memory encoding (Wills et
al. 2000) or may require distinct retrieval. Finally, a small
cluster in the LH posterior cingulate (PC) also showed an
insight effect. There was strong, sustained FMRI signal for
both solution types in this region; on the fringe of this
responding region, FMRI signal began earlier following
insight than noninsight solutions. The lateness of the FMRI
signal across LH PC suggests that this effect began later in the
response sequence, rather than during solution generation.
Finally, as in most FMRI studies, signal was relatively weak in
temporal pole and orbitofrontal areas due to magnetic
susceptibility artifact, so we cannot rule out undetected
effects in those areas.
Several cortical areas showed strong solution-related FMRI
signal, but approximately equally for insight and noninsight
solutions. Some of these areas (e.g., motor cortex) relate to
the response sequence rather than solution processes; other
areas probably reﬂect component processes of a problem-
Table 1. Full FMRI Results of Insight Effect
Gyrus/Structure Brodmann Volume Center Coordinates Mean Max Mean t Max t Max t Coordinates
Area XYZ % sig % sig XYZ
RH superior temporal 21/22 531 43 –7 –13 0.18 0.25 3.84 4.89 44 –9 –9
RH inferior frontal* 45/46/13 359 46 28 9 0.17 0.21 3.14 3.51 45 26 11
LH inferior frontal* 45/46/13 250 –46 25 14 0.14 0.15 3.20 3.23 –49 24 12
LH medial frontal 10 453 –20 47 6 0.13 0.15 3.80 4.72 –19 48 7
LH posterior cingulate 31 266 –9 –57 21 0.13 0.15 3.68 4.12 –9 –57 21
LH amygdala/parahipp. ND 266 –16 –2 –8 0.13 0.17 3.74 4.13 –16 –2 –9
RH amygdala/parahipp. ND 141 11 –11 –16 0.12 0.15 ND 3.89 13 –8 –15
All areas showing an ‘‘insight effect’’—stronger signal for insight solutions than noninsight solutions (ordered by mean percent signal change). All cluster sizes represent
active voxels at t(12) = 3.43, p , 0.005, except bilateral inferior frontal gyrus areas (*), shown at 2.83, p , 0.015, because it was an a priori region of interest. Location of
cluster centers and peak t values are shown in Talairach coordinates.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.t001
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Insight in the Brainsolving network common to both insight and noninsight
solving, such as retrieving potential solutions. Two areas that
may be of interest for future studies are AC and posterior
middle/superior temporal gyrus. Both these areas, in the RH
only, showed strong, negative solution-related signal, approx-
imately equal in the two solution types. AC is an area that
might be predicted to be involved in reorienting attention as
solvers overcome impasses, given its role in performance
monitoring and cognitive control (MacDonald et al. 2000).
RH posterior MTG is active when subjects ‘‘get’’ jokes (Goel
and Dolan 2001) and when they attempt to solve problems
with deductive reasoning (Parsons and Osherson 2001).
However, in our experiment, only the RH aSTG showed a
robust insight effect.
Experiment 2
A separate group of subjects participated in fundamentally
the same paradigm while we continuously recorded EEGs
from the scalp. We then compared time-frequency analyses of
the EEGs associated with insight solutions versus noninsight
solutions. EEG provides temporal resolution greatly superior
to that of FMRI and thus can better elucidate the time course
and suddenness of the insight effect. Furthermore, complex
EEG oscillations can be parsed into constituent frequency
components, some of which have been linked to particular
types of neural and cognitive processes (Ward 2003).
The high temporal resolution of EEG allows us to address
one of the fundamental questions raised earlier: does insight
really occur suddenly, as subjective experience suggests? For
problems typically solved without insight, solvers report
gradually increasing closeness to solution. In contrast, for
problems typically solved with insight, solvers report little or
no progress until shortly before they actually solve the
problem (Metcalfe 1986; Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987). Similarly,
quantitative analyses of the distributions of response times
and accuracies during anagram solving (a task frequently
eliciting the experience of insight) reveal that a solution
becomes available in a discrete transition from a state of little
or no information about the correct response directly to the
ﬁnal state of high accuracy. This contrasts with various
language and memory tasks not associated with insight, which
yield partial outputs before processing has been completed
(Kounios and Smith 1995; Smith and Kounios 1996).
We predicted that a sudden change in neural activity
associated with insight solutions would produce an EEG
correlate. Speciﬁcally, we predicted that high-frequency EEG
oscillations in the gamma band (i.e., greater than 30 Hz)
would reﬂect this sudden activity, because prior research has
associated gamma-band activity with the activation of
perceptual, lexical, and semantic representations (Tallon-
Baudry and Bertrand 1999; Pulvermu ¨ller 2001). Gamma-band
electrical activity correlates with the blood oxygenation level–
dependent (BOLD) response apparent in FMRI signal; lower-
frequency EEG components do not seem to have direct
correlates in FMRI signal (Foucher et al. 2003; Laufs et al.
2003). Consequently, based on the language literature
discussed earlier and on our FMRI results, we predicted a
discrete insight-related increase in gamma-band activity at
electrodes over the anterior temporal lobe of the RH.
Participants solved 46% (s.d. = 8.2) of the problems
correctly within the time limit. Of correctly solved problems,
subjects reported more insight solutions (56%, s.d. = 8.4)
than noninsight solutions (42%, s.d. = 9.0), (t[18] = 3.47,
p=0.003); there was no difference in mean response times
(insight solutions = 9.94 s, s.d. = 2.60; noninsight solu-
tions=9.25 s, s.d. = 3.06; t , 1.0).
There was a burst of gamma-band activity associated with
c o r r e c ti n s i g h ts o l u t i o n s( b u tn o tn o n i n s i g h ts o l u t i o n s )
beginning approximately 0.3 s before the button-press
solution response at anterior right temporal electrodes
(Figure 4), with no signiﬁcant difference between insight
and noninsight solutions over homologous LH sites. A
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed
on log-transformed gamma-band (39 Hz) EEG power at left
and right temporal electrode sites (T7 and T8, respectively)
for insight and noninsight trials using two time windows
( 1.52 to  0.36 s and  0.30 to  0.02 s, measured with respect
to the solution response) yielded signiﬁcant insight 3 time
window (F[1,18] = 6.68, p = 0.019) and insight3time window
3 Hemisphere (F[1,18] = 8.11, p = 0.011) interactions. The
overall interaction occurred because there was an insight 3
hemisphere interaction from 0.30 to 0.02 s (F[1,18] = 4.61,
p = 0.046) but no effect in the  1.52 to  0.36 s time window.
Within the  0.30 to  0.02 s interval for these two electrodes,
there was a signiﬁcant insight effect at the right temporal (T8)
site (t[18] = 3.48, p = 0.003), but not at the homologous left
temporal (T7) site or any other LH temporal electrode.
Laplacian mapping of this effect (Figure 4B) is remarkably
consistent with the FMRI signal in RH aSTG observed in
Experiment 1. (EEG does not have the spatial resolution of
FMRI. However, we used the Laplacian transform [i.e., second
spatial derivative] to localize observed activity. The Laplacian
derivation acts as a high-pass spatial ﬁlter that reduces the
contribution from activity in distant areas of the brain to the
signal at a given electrode, and therefore reﬂects relatively
focal and proximal brain activity. Given our FMRI results and
the demonstrated correspondence between high-frequency
EEG activity and FMRI signal [Foucher et al. 2003; Laufs et al.
2003], we are conﬁdent in the localization of this effect.)
The gamma burst in the right temporal area cannot be
attributed to motor processes involved in making the
response because (A) motor activity associated with the
bimanual button press would have caused a bilateral gamma
burst, not a unilateral one; (B) the location of the gamma
burst as determined by Laplacian mapping (Figure 4B) is not
consistent with hand-related motor cortex activity; and (C)
both insight and noninsight solutions required button
presses.
Other planned statistical tests (ANOVAs) examined possi-
ble insight-related frontal theta (5–8 Hz), posterior alpha (8–
13 Hz), and fronto-central beta (13–20 Hz) activity. There
were no statistically signiﬁcant theta or beta effects. (Visual
inspection and post hoc statistical tests suggested insight-
related frontal 4-Hz activity, but this effect cannot be reliably
distinguished from possible artifacts due to small vertical eye
movements.) There was a signiﬁcant posterior alpha effect,
which is discussed below.
Discussion
Complex problem solving requires a complex cortical
network to encode the problem information, search memory
for relevant information, evaluate this information, apply
operators, and so forth. The FMRI and EEG results reported
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with insight requires at least one additional component to
this cortical network, involving RH aSTG, that is less
important to solving without insight. The insight effect in
RH aSTG accords with the literature on integrating distant or
novel semantic relations during language comprehension.
When people comprehend (read or listen to) sentences or
stories, neural activity increases in aSTG or temporal pole
bilaterally more than when comprehending single words
(Mazoyer et al. 1993; Bottini et al. 1994; Stowe et al. 1999;
Humphries et al. 2001; Meyer et al. 2000). Neural activity
increases in predominantly RH aSTG during tasks that
emphasize integration across sentences to extract themes
(St. George et al. 1999) or to form more coherent memories
for stories (Mason and Just 2004). RH aSTG is also selectively
active when subjects must generate the best ending to a
sentence (Kircher et al. 2001) or mentally repair grammati-
cally incorrect sentences (Meyer et al. 2000), both of which
likely require intense semantic integration.
Like the results in language processing, the current results
are predicted by the theory that the RH performs relatively
coarse semantic coding (Beeman 1998; similarly, Chiarello et
al. 1990). This theory contends that when people encounter
words, semantic processing in several LH areas engages in
relatively ﬁne semantic coding which produces small seman-
tic ﬁelds—i.e., this processing strongly focuses on a few
concepts closely related to the input word in the given
context. This is very effective for most straightforward
language processing. In contrast, the homologous RH areas
engage in relatively coarse semantic coding, which produces
large and weak semantic ﬁelds—i.e., this processing includes
many concepts, even concepts distantly related to the input
words and context. This process is ineffective for rapid
interpretation or selection but increases semantic overlap
among multiple semantic ﬁelds (Beeman et al. 1994), which is
useful when drawing together parts of a story or conversation
that are only distantly related (Beeman 1993; Beeman et al.
2000). In this view, the coarseness of semantic coding is
largely inﬂuenced by slight asymmetries in neural micro-
circuitry that produce more discrete, less redundant input
ﬁelds in pyramidal neurons of the LH language cortex, and
more overlapping input ﬁelds in corresponding neurons in
the RH (for reviews see Beeman 1998; Hutsler and Galuske
2003).
We suggest that semantic integration, generally, is impor-
tant for connecting various problem elements together and
connecting the problem to the solution, and that coarsely
coded semantic integration, computed in RH aSTG, is
especially critical to insight solutions, at least for verbal
problems (or problems that can be solved with verbal or
semantic information). People come to an impasse on insight
problems because their retrieval efforts are misdirected by
ambiguous information in the problem or by their usual
method for solving similar problems. Large semantic ﬁelds
allowing for more overlap among distantly related concepts
(or distantly associated lexical items) may help overcome this
impasse. Because this semantic processing is weak, it may
remain unconscious, perhaps overshadowed by stronger
processing of the misdirected information (Schooler et al.
1993; Smith 1995), and solvers remain stuck at impasse.
Eventually, solution-related information bursts into aware-
ness ‘‘in a sudden ﬂash.’’ This can happen after misdirected
Figure 4. Gamma-Band Power for Insight and Noninsight Solutions
(A) Grand average time course of EEG power (in v
2)a t3 9H z
estimated with the Morlet wavelet transform at right superior
temporal electrode T8. The x-axis represents time (in seconds) with
the yellow arrow and R marking the point in time of the solution
button-press response (i.e., 0.0 s). The green horizontal bars above the
x-axis represent the time intervals used in the statistical analyses and
topographic maps. Note that gamma-band power for insight trials
(red line) starts to increase above power on noninsight trials (blue
line) by approximately 0.3 s before the button press.
(B) Time-frequency plots of the insight minus noninsight difference
shown in (A). The y-axis represents frequency (in Hz); the x-axis
represents time (in seconds, with respect to the button press, exactly
as shown in [A]). Red areas of the plot reﬂect times and frequencies at
which insight EEG power is greater than noninsight EEG power; blue
areas reﬂect times and frequencies at which noninsight EEG power is
greater than insight EEG power. Note the sudden emergence of
increased gamma power for insight solutions approximately 0.3 s
before the button press.
(C) Insight minus noninsight gamma-band differences plotted as
topographic maps (LH and RH) of scalp current density (in v
2/m
2)
estimated by a spline-based Laplacian transform computed with a
realistic FMRI-derived head model. The Laplacian transform acts as a
high-pass spatial ﬁlter that minimizes the contribution of activity
distant from each electrode, thereby manifesting discrete, relatively
superﬁcial sources. The maps are thresholded to show foci of current
density at the upper and lower 20% of the scale. Note the prominent
effect of insight (effect for insight greater than effect for noninsight,
in red) at the right superior temporal electrode (T8) and surrounding
electrodes present from  0.30 to  0.02 s (measured with respect to
the solution response) that is not present in the earlier epoch ( 1.52
to 0.36 s). The blue area over left inferior parietal cortex (electrode
P7) indicates that noninsight gamma power is nonsigniﬁcantly
greater than insight power (F[1,19] , 1) over this region.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g004
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Insight in the Brainprocessing decays or is suppressed, after solution-related
processing grows, or after environmental cues occur—such as
the water overﬂowing the bathtub when Archimedes got in.
Archimedes had semantic and verbal knowledge about how to
compute density from weight and volume, but struggled with
measuring the volume of an irregularly shaped crown without
harming the crown (e.g., melting it). His observation of water
displacement allowed him to connect known concepts in new
ways. This is the nature of many insights, the recognition of
new connections across existing knowledge.
A persistent question has been whether the cognitive and
neural events that lead to insight are as sudden as the
subjective experience. The timing and frequency character-
istics of the EEG results shed light on this question. We
propose that the gamma-band insight effect in Experiment 2
reﬂects the sudden transition of solution-related cognitive
processing from an unconscious to a conscious state. Recent
research associates gamma-band oscillations with the ignition
of neural cell assemblies supporting the transient feature
binding necessary to activate a representation (Tallon-Baudry
and Bertrand 1999; Pulvermu ¨ller 2001)—in this case, a
phonological, lexical, or semantic representation correspond-
ing to the solution word and its associations to the problem
words. According to this hypothesis, greater synchronous
gamma-band activity for insight than for noninsight solutions
could reﬂect a more integrated or unitized solution repre-
sentation. Furthermore, synchronous gamma-band activity
has been hypothesized to play a critical role in the
accessibility to consciousness of such representations (Engel
and Singer 2001). The timing (with respect to the solution
button press) of the insight gamma-band effect closely
approximates estimates derived from cognitive behavioral
studies of the amount of time required to access an available
solution and generate a two-alternative, forced-choice but-
ton-press response (e.g., Kounios et al. 1987; Meyer et al. 1988;
Smith and Kounios 1996). The present experiments had no
response choice (i.e., always the same bimanual button press
for solutions), so subjects could easily have responded 0.3 s
after solving the problems. Thus, we infer that the observed
gamma burst reﬂects the sudden conscious availability of a
solution word resulting from an insight.
Suddenly recognizing new connections between problem
elements is a hallmark of insight, but it is only one
component of a large cortical network necessary for solving
problems with insight, and recognizing new connections
likely contributes to other tasks, such as understanding
metaphors (Bottini et al. 1994) and deriving a story theme
(St. George et al. 1999). Similar tasks may depend on related
cortical networks. For example, appreciating semantic jokes
(Goel and Dolan 2001) and engaging in deductive reasoning
that sometimes involves insight (Parsons and Osherson 2001)
both increase activity in RH posterior MTG. It is striking that
the insight effect observed in the RH in our experiments
occurred when people solved verbal problems, which tradi-
tional views suggest should involve mostly LH processing with
little or no contribution from the RH. It is possible that
insight solutions to nonverbal problems would require
different cortical networks. However, the observed effect
cannot be due simply to verbal retrieval, which must occur
for both insight and noninsight solutions; it could be due to a
type of verbal retrieval speciﬁc to insight solutions, but not
involved in noninsight solutions.
We turn now to another result from the EEG time-
frequency analysis, which was not predicted but nevertheless
suggests a provocative interpretation. The gamma burst
thought to reﬂect the transition of the insight solution from
an unconscious to a conscious state was preceded by insight-
speciﬁc activity in the alpha band (8–13 Hz). Speciﬁcally,
there was a burst of alpha power (estimated at 9.8 Hz)
associated with insight solutions detected over right posterior
parietal cortex from approximately 1.4 s until approximately
0.4 s before the solution response, at which point insight
alpha power decreased to the level of noninsight alpha power,
or below (Figure 5). An ANOVA was performed on log-
transformed alpha-band (9.8 Hz) EEG power at left and right
parietal-occipital electrode sites (PO7 and PO8, respectively)
for insight and noninsight trials using three time windows:
 2.06 to  1.56 s,  1.31 to  0.56 s, and  0.31 to 0.06 s
Figure 5. Alpha-Band Power for Insight and Noninsight Solutions
(Same conventions as in Figure 4). (A) Time course of EEG power at
9.8 Hz (in v
2) at right parietal-occipital electrode (PO8). The x-axis
represents time (in seconds), with the green horizontal bars above the
x-axis representing the time intervals used in the statistical analyses
and topographic maps. The yellow arrow and R (at 0.0 s) signify the
time of the button-press response.
(B) Time-frequency plots of the insight minus noninsight difference
shown in (A).
(C) Insight minus noninsight alpha-band differences plotted as
topographic maps of scalp current density (in v
2/m
2). Note that
alpha-band power is signiﬁcantly greater for insight solutions than
noninsight solutions during the  1.31 to  0.56 s interval, but not
during the preceding ( 2.06 to 1.56 s) or subsequent ( 0.31 toþ0.06
s) intervals. This alpha burst was embedded in a slow decrease in
alpha (see [A]), probably reﬂecting a general increase in cortical
activity as effort increases during the course of problem solving.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g005
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Insight in the Brain(measured from the solution button press). This analysis
yielded a signiﬁcant insight 3 time window interaction
(F[2,36] = 4.13, p = 0.027, with the Huynh-Feldt correction).
Follow-up t-tests in each time window yielded signiﬁcant
effects of insight in the ﬁrst time window at both electrode
sites (PO7: t[18] = 2.32, p = 0.033; PO8: t[18] = 2.42, p =
0.026) and in the second time window only at the RH site
(PO8: t[18] = 2.17, p = 0.043), with a reversal of the direction
of the effect. The third time window yielded no signiﬁcant
effects.
Alpha rhythms are understood to reﬂect idling or
inhibition of cortical areas (Pfurtscheller et al. 1996).
Increased alpha power measured over parietal-occipital
cortex indicates idling or inhibition of visual cortex. This
has been attributed to gating of visual information ﬂowing
into the perceptual system in order to protect fragile or
resource-intensive processes from interference from bottom-
up stimulation (Ray and Cole 1985; Worden et al. 2001; Jensen
et al. 2002; Cooper et al. 2003; Ward 2003). This interpreta-
tion assumes that brain areas are normally highly interactive,
and that allowing one process to proceed relatively inde-
pendently requires active attenuation of this interaction. For
instance, when subjects attend to visual space in the hemiﬁeld
projecting to one hemisphere, posterior alpha increases over
the other hemisphere, which receives inputs from the
unattended hemiﬁeld (Worden et al. 2001). Analogously, the
present results suggest selective gating of visual inputs to the
RH during the interval preceding the insight-related right
temporal gamma burst (Figure 6). Hypothetically, this allows
weaker processing about more distant associations between
the problem words and potential solutions to gain strength,
by attenuating bottom-up activation or other neural activity
not related to solution that would decrease the signal-to-
noise ratio for the actual solution.
This interpretation of the early insight-speciﬁc alpha effect
is consistent with previous behavioral research suggesting
that, prior to an insight, the solution to a verbal problem can
be weakly activated (Bowers et al. 1990), especially in the RH
(Bowden and Beeman 1998; Bowden and Jung-Beeman
2003a). Thus insight solutions may be associated with early
unconscious solution-related processing, followed by a
sudden transition to full awareness of the solution. We
suggest that, in Experiment 2, the early posterior alpha
insight effect is an indirect correlate of the former, and the
right temporal gamma effect is a direct correlate of the latter.
In sum, when people solve problems with insight, leading to
an ‘‘Aha!’’ experience, their solutions are accompanied by a
striking increase in neural activity in RH aSTG. Thus, within
the network of cortical areas required for problem solving,
different components are engaged or emphasized when
solving with versus without insight. We propose that the RH
aSTG facilitates integration of information across distant
lexical or semantic relations, allowing solvers to see con-
nections that had previously eluded them. In the two
millennia since Archimedes shouted ‘‘Eureka!,’’ it has seemed
common knowledge that people sometimes solve problems—
whether great scientiﬁc questions or trivial puzzles—by a
seemingly distinct mechanism called insight. This mechanism
involves suddenly seeing a problem in a new light, often
without awareness of how that new light was switched on. We
have demonstrated that insight solutions are indeed associ-
ated with a discrete, distinct pattern of neural activity,
supporting unique cognitive processes.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. Ten men and eight women were paid to participate in
Experiment 1; 19 new subjects (nine men, ten women) were paid to
participate in Experiment 2. All were young (18–29) neurologically
intact, right-handed, native English speakers; Experiment 1 partic-
ipants met safety criteria for FMRI scanning. After hearing about all
methods and risks and performing practice trials, they consented to
participate. In Experiment 1, data from four men and one woman
were excluded due to poor FMRI signal or because subjects provided
fewer than ten insight or noninsight responses. This research was
approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review
Board.
Behavioral paradigm. Following practice, subjects attempted 124
compound remote associate problems during FMRI scanning. These
problems (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003b) can be solved quickly
and evoke an ‘‘Aha!’’ experience, producing a distinct behavioral
signature (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003a), roughly half the time
they are solved. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events for each
trial. Each trial began with the task label ‘‘Compound’’ presented on
liquid crystal diode goggles for 0.5 to 2.5 s. A gating signal from the
scanner triggered the central presentation of three problem words,
which persisted until subjects solved the problem or 30 s elapsed. If
subjects solved the problem, they made a bimanual button press, after
which the word ‘‘Solution?’’ prompted them to verbalize their
solution. After 2 s the word ‘‘Insight?’’ prompted subjects to press
buttons indicating whether they solved the problem with insight.
Prior to the experiment subjects were told the following: ‘‘A feeling
of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and
obviousness. You may not be sure how you came up with the answer,
but are relatively conﬁdent that it is correct without having to
mentally check it. It is as though the answer came into mind all at
once—when you ﬁrst thought of the word, you simply knew it was the
answer. This feeling does not have to be overwhelming, but should
resemble what was just described.’’ The experimenter interacted with
subjects until this description was clear. This subjective rating could
be used differently across subjects (or even across trials), blurring
condition boundaries; yet the distinct neural correlates of insight
observed across the group demonstrate that there was some
consistency.
Figure 6. The Time Course of the Insight Effect
Alpha power (9.8 Hz at right parietal-occipital electrode PO8) and
gamma power (39 Hz at right temporal electrode T8) for the insight
effect (i.e., correct insight solutions minus correct noninsight
solutions, in v
2). The left y-axis shows the magnitude of the alpha
insight effect (purple line); the right y-axis applies to the gamma
insight effect (green line). The x-axis represents time (in seconds). The
yellow arrow and R (at 0.0 s) signify the time of the button-press
response. Note the transient enhancement of alpha on insight trials
(relative to noninsight trials) prior to the gamma burst.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.g006
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prompt appeared, and subjects pressed the ‘‘no’’ buttons and
verbalized ‘‘Don’t Know.’’ Then the ‘‘Insight?’’ prompt appeared,
and subjects pressed the ‘‘no’’ buttons again. After the insight rating,
subjects performed three line-matching trials (3 s each) to distract
them from thinking about the problems, allowing the critical BOLD
signal to return to baseline (Binder et al. 1999). The total time from
the end of one problem to the onset of the next was 14.5–16.5 s. The
condition (e.g., insight or noninsight solution) and time of events was
determined by subjects’ responses.
Image acquisition. Imaging was performed at the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania, on a 1.5 Tesla GE SIGNA scanner with a
fast gradient system for echo-planar imaging and a standard head
coil. Head motion was restricted with plastic braces and foam
padding. Anatomical high-resolution T1-weighted axial and sagittal
images were acquired while subjects performed practice trials.
Functional images (21 slices, 5 mm thick; 3.75-mm 3 3.75-mm in-
plane resolution; TR = 2000 ms for 21 slices; time to echo = 40 ms)
were acquired in the same axial plane as the anatomical images using
gradient-echo echo-planar sequences sensitive to BOLD signal
(Kwong et al. 1992; Ogawa et al. 1992). Each functional run was
preceded by a 20-s saturation period. Subjects participated in four
15-min runs and a ﬁfth run of varying length, depending on the
number of remaining problems.
Image analysis. Images were coregistered through time with a
three-dimensional registration algorithm (Cox 1996). Echo planar
imaging volumes were spatially smoothed using a 7.5-mm full-width
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Within each run, voxels were
eliminated if the signal magnitude changed more than 10% across
successive TRs, or if the mean signal level was below a noise threshold.
Functional data were transformed (Collins et al. 1994) to a standard
stereotaxic atlas (Talairach and Tournoux 1988) with a voxel size of
2.5 mm
3.
Data were analyzed using general linear model analysis that
extracted average responses to each trial type, correcting for linear
drift and removing signal changes correlated with head motion. Each
TR was divided into two 1-s images to improve time locking of the
solving event and the functional image data (time-course data were
temporally smoothed in Figures 2 and 3). Solution-related responses
were calculated using the average signal change within the window 4–
9 s (to account for hemodynamic delay) after the solving event
(beginning about 2 s prior to the button press). Differences between
insight and noninsight solution events were estimated for each
participant, then combined in a second-stage random effects analysis
to identify differences consistent across all subjects. A cluster
threshold was set at regions at least 500 mm
3 in volume (32
normalized voxels, or 7.1 original-sized voxels) in which each voxel
was reliably different across subjects, (t[12] . 3.43, p , 0.005
uncorrected). Monte Carlo simulations with similar datasets reveal
low false positive rates with these criteria. RH aSTG was the only
cluster to exceed these criteria, and converging evidence and the a
priori prediction about RH aSTG strengthen conﬁdence in this
result.
Experiment 2. Behavioral procedures were similar to those of
Experiment 1, except that (A) problem words were presented at
smaller visual angles to discourage eye movements, (B) there were 2-s
delays between each event in the response sequence, and (C) subjects
triggered a new problem directly after responding to the previous
problem (i.e., no line task occurred between problems).
EEG methods. Continuous high-density EEGs were recorded at 250
Hz (bandpass: 0.2–100 Hz) from 128 tin electrodes embedded in an
elastic cap (linked mastoid reference with forehead ground) placed
according to the extended International 10–20 System. Prior to data
analysis, EEG channels with excessive noise were replaced with
interpolated data from neighboring channels. Eyeblink artifacts were
removed from the EEG with an adaptive ﬁlter separately constructed
for each subject using EMSE 5.0 (Source Signal Imaging Inc., San
Diego, California, United States). Induced oscillations were analyzed
by segmenting each subject’s continuous EEG into 4-s segments
beginning 3 s before each solution response. (An analysis epoch
beginning at an earlier point in time would have resulted in the loss
of trials associated with response times of less than 3 s.)
Time-frequency transforms (performed with EMSE 5.0) were
obtained by the application of complex-valued Grossmann-Morlet
wavelets, which are Gaussian in both time and frequency. Following
Torrence and Campo (1998), the mother wavelet, u0, in the time
domain has the form
u0 t ðÞ¼p 1=4e ix0te t2
2 ð1Þ
where x0 is a nondimensional frequency. In this case, x0 is chosen to
be 5.336, so that
R
u0 t ðÞﬃ0. The constant p 1
4 = is a normalization
factor such that
R
u0 t ðÞ ðÞ
2 ¼ 1. For the discrete time case, a family of
wavelets may be obtained as
u s;n ðÞ ¼ p 1=4e 
ix0ndt
s e
 
ndt ðÞ 2
s2 ð2Þ
where dt is the sample period (in seconds), s is the scale (in seconds),
and n is an integer that counts the number of samples from the
starting time. The Fourier wavelength k is given by
k ¼
4ps
x0 þ 2 þ x2
0
   1
2 = ð3Þ
In the frequency domain, the (continuous) Fourier transform of
Equation 2 is
^ u u s;x ðÞ ¼ p 1=4H x ðÞ e 
sx x0 ðÞ
2
2 ð4Þ
where
H x ðÞ ¼ 0 x   0
1 x.0
:
 
One reasonable way to measure the ‘‘resolution’’ of the wavelet
transform is to consider the dispersion of the wavelets in both time
and frequency. Since the wavelets are Gaussian in both domains, the
e-folding time and frequency may serve as quantitative measures of
dispersion. Note that these dispersions are a function of the scale, s.
For a selected frequency, fc ¼ 1
k = , or from Equation 3
sc ¼
x0 þ 2 þ x2
0
   1=2
4pfc
ð5Þ
Then substituting into Equation 2, we ﬁnd that the e-folding time is
se ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
sc for frequency fc. From Equation 2, the e-folding frequency is
xe   xc ¼
ﬃﬃ
2
p
sc . To make this concrete, we ﬁnd that for a 10-Hz (alpha-
band) center frequency, the e-folding time is 0.12 s and the e-folding
frequency is 2.6 Hz. For a 40-Hz ( gamma-band) center frequency, the
e-folding time is 0.03 s and the e-folding frequency is 10.5 Hz. Note
that these e-folding parameters imply that wavelet scaling preserves
the joint time-frequency resolution (equal areas in time-frequency
space), with higher temporal resolution but broader frequency
resolution as the wavelet scale decreases.
Segments corresponding to trials for which individual subjects
produced the correct response were isolated and averaged separately
according to whether or not the subject reported the experience of
insight. Planned statistical tests (repeated-measure ANOVAs) were
performed in order to detect insight-related effects on frontal
midline theta (5–8 Hz), posterior alpha (8–13 Hz), fronto-central beta
(13–20 Hz), and left and right temporal gamma (20–50 Hz). Response-
locked event-related potentials (ERPs) were also computed using the
same analysis epoch. Standard ERP analyses yielded no evidence of
statistically signiﬁcant effects, likely because ERPs reﬂect phase-
locked activity rather than the induced (i.e., nonphase-locked) activity
examined in the wavelet analyses; due to the long response times
evident in this experiment, phase locking resulting from problem
presentation would not be expected.
EEG effects were topographically mapped by employing spline-
based Laplacian mapping with an FMRI-derived realistic head model
and digitized electrode positions. Localization of EEG/ERP signals is a
form of probabilistic modelling rather than direct neuroimaging. In
contrast to other techniques, source estimation by Laplacian
mapping indicates the presence of superﬁcial foci of neuroelectric
activity with minimal assumptions.
Supporting Information
Figure S1. Cortical Regions Showing ‘‘Insight Effects’’ Below Cluster
Size Threshold
The far left lane shows for each region a single slice best depicting the
cluster activated above threshold; middle lane shows time course of
signal following insight (red line) and noninsight (blue line) solutions,
across the entire active cluster; right panel shows the ‘‘insight effect’’
(insight signal minus noninsight signal, error bars show the standard
error of the mean of the difference at each timepoint).
(A) depicts bilateral IFG with lowered threshold (t[12] = 2.83, p ,
0.015); (B–D) depict clusters of FMRI signal at the same t-threshold
used in the main paper (t[12] = 3.43, p , 0.005), but the clusters are
too small to surpass cluster criterion.
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Insight in the Brain(B) LH medial frontal gyrus;
(C) LH PC gyrus;
(D) LH amygdala (there was also a small cluster near RH amygdala).
Spatial coordinates and other are details listed in Table 1.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097.sg001 (914 KB PDF).
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